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Petrobras: The Unique Structure 
behind Latin America’s Best 
Performing Oil Company
 Genaro Arriagada and Chris Cote
B
razil’s oil and gas 
giant Petrobras stands 
among the world’s most 
successful businesses, 
admired by the public as 
well as by private and state-owned 
national and transnational oil 
companies. Petrobras today is active 
in 23 countries in the exploration, 
production, refining, distribution 
and sale of oil, gas and energy, as 
well as petrochemicals, biofuels and 
electricity.
Latin America’s most successful 
oil company owes its success at 
least in part to Brazil’s condition 
as an oil-poor country with a 
government that does not see it as a 
cash cow. Unlike the other state-
owned powerhouses in the region, 
Mexico’s PEMEX and Venezuela’s 
PDVSA, Petrobras grew gradually 
on a reputation for efficiency, 
ensuring crucial funding from 
government and other sources. The 
recent discovery of pre-salt oil now 
presents the company with the 
opportunity to exploit immense 
new reserves. 
A Remarkable Success
After recovering quickly from 
the recent financial crisis, Petrobras 
is considered the world’s eighth 
largest corporation and is often 
described as Latin America’s best-
managed company.  
Brazil’s oil and natural gas 
production are rising: Oil production 
is projected to increase by 60% by Petrobras headquarters, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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2014 and 130% by 2020 (compared 
to 2008). Natural gas production 
is estimated to increase by 100 and 
245%, respectively. Company reports 
estimate that in 2014 Petrobras 
will produce 3 million barrels of oil 
per day and 623,000 barrels of oil 
equivalent (boe) in natural gas. 
Petrobras’s investment is 
enormous. Its 2010-2014 Business 
Plan calls for an investment of $224 
billion (some $45 billion per year), 
more than five times the investment 
level of PDVSA, according to 
independent estimates. 
Petrobras’s efficiency compares 
exceedingly well to oil companies 
of similar size, although accurate 
comparisons are difficult as most 
similar sized national oil companies 
(NOCs) —the majority in the 
Persian Gulf—do not provide 
audited figures. Industry analysts 
believe that Petrobras vastly 
outperforms all of them. Petrobras 
also ranks exceptionally high when 
compared with the supermajors. 
Statists vs. Free Enterprisers
The history of Petrobras is rife 
with tension, largely between those 
who wanted a fully state-owned 
enterprise (“statists”) and those who 
envisioned Petrobras as a private 
company (“free enterprisers”). 
The Brazilian government 
cemented Petrobras’s status as a 
state institution with several laws 
between the 1940s and 1960s, and 
the Federal Constitution of 1988, 
which enacted a state monopoly 
over all aspects of the hydrocarbons 
industry, put Petrobras firmly in 
state hands. 
After several unsuccessful 
attempts in the early 1990s, reform 
proponents finally had some 
success under the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. A 
1995 Constitutional amendment 
authorized the federal government 
“to outsource oil and gas activities 
under state monopoly to private or 
government-owned companies.” 
Two years later, Congress set a 
new industry framework segregating 
Petrobras’s business and regulatory 
roles. Petrobras kept the former 
while the latter was transferred to 
a new National Petroleum Agency 
(ANP), effective in January 1998. 
The interaction between Petrobras 
and the ANP is among the keys to 
understanding the success of Brazil’s 
oil policy. 
The ANP’s ample powers include 
the awarding of exploration and 
production bids for oil, natural gas 
and other liquid fuel concessions; 
approving the import, export and 
transportation of natural gas, oil 
and its derivatives; and playing a 
regulatory, oversight and dispute-
settlement role in substantive 
cases. While maintaining a state 
monopoly on oil and gas, Brazil 
grants exploration and production 
concessions to Petrobras, private 
companies and joint efforts. In 
January 2002, the country also 
deregulated imports, exports and 
prices. 
A Very Special Government 
Corporation
The recurring conflict between 
statists and free enterprisers, which 
has never been fully resolved, is 
fundamental to understanding 
how Petrobras became a sui generis 
national oil company. Petrobras 
has dual status as a government 
corporation with a crucial role in 
Brazilian growth and as a dividend-
paying private company.
Private involvement in Petrobras 
would not have been possible 
without a legal framework 
guaranteeing government control. 
Brazil shares with many other 
countries a nationalistic concern 
about oil resources, especially with 
regard to selling into foreign hands. 
Rather than risk denationalization 
of the industry, Law 9478 of 1997 
ensured that private shareholders 
had practically no non-economic 
rights, especially over management 
function, by separating stock 
into voting common shares and 
non-voting preferred shares. It 
also required state ownership of 
50%-plus-one of voting shares. A 
complementary 1999 law extended 
the possibility of stock ownership 
to foreign companies and 
individuals. Foreign-owned stock 
now exceeds the share in private 
Brazilian hands.  
State Business
A nine-member board of 
directors heads Petrobras. Seven 
members are government-
appointed, one represents non-
government minority common 
shareholders, and another is elected 
by preferred shareholders. The 
board is made up of cabinet-level 
officials (President Dilma Rousseff 
was previously a member), former 
military officials and academics, 
all with close or direct ruling party 
ties. One responsibility of the CEO 
is to propose a slate of six general 
managers for board approval or 
rejection. Along with the CEO, 
these general managers make up 
the executive board that runs the 
company. All board members 
except the CEO have had at least 
30 years of experience in Petrobras. 
Petrobras works closely with 
Congress and the administration. 
State oversight is exercised through 
legislative approval of multi-
year plans that establish general 
company goals and budgetary 
and investment guidelines. The 
plan helps entrench in law a 
medium-term budget timeframe 
free from Finance Ministry fiat. 
Petrobras operational, economic and 
government policy are harmonized 
through executive approval of a 
Global Expense Program.
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Private Investment and Oversight
Private ownership in Petrobras has 
expanded dramatically in the last 
decade. The number of shareholders 
grew by 153,000 between 2000 
and 2008, and today one million 
individuals hold shares in Petrobras-
related securities. 
Privatization proponents often 
claim that companies are more 
efficient and profitable in private 
hands. Petrobras has performed 
outstandingly in state hands while 
keeping the private sector in the role 
of a mere investor. Placing stock 
in private hands, however, had a 
fundamental effect on efficiency. It 
made Petrobras subject to the same 
oversight standards that apply to 
private multinationals, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with audits and 
oversight conducted by a securities 
commission. The presence of private 
shareholders also serves as a check 
on government attempts to milk 
NOCs for cash. 
Opportunities and Challenges in 
Pre-Salt
When the pre-salt oil reserves—
estimated to contain 50 billion 
boe—were discovered off Brazil’s 
southeast coast in 2006 and 2007, 
the Lula administration quickly 
moved to bring the oil under more 
direct state control. The government 
passed four laws in 2010 that 
effectively limit foreign participation 
and guarantee Petrobras a majority 
hand in production.   
The first law created a new, state-
owned company, Pré-Sal Petróleo 
S.A. (PPSA), to manage pre-salt 
production sharing contracts 
entered into by the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. The second 
authorized the government to 
cede Petrobras exploration and 
production rights to the equivalent 
of 5 billion boe in the pre-salt 
in exchange for a company share 
package whose value is set by law. 
The third made Petrobras the 
sole operator of pre-salt projects 
and gave it a 30% minimum 
stake in each. Finally, the fourth 
law created a social fund that 
will invest pre-salt profits in 
education, anti-poverty initiatives, 
the environment, science and 
technology.  
This legislation—especially 
Petrobras’s required operatorship in 
each project—presents an enormous 
opportunity to increase production 
levels over the next decade, but 
it also demands of Petrobras a 
high level of capitalization, skilled 
labor and management, technical 
expertise and efficiency. While 
Petrobras is widely considered to 
be capable and experienced enough 
to tackle the pre-salt, the amount 
of new production projects coming 
online will test the company’s 
human resource capacity and could 
undermine the sound management 
and organization that have brought 
it success up to this point. Critics 
of greater state control over the 
pre-salt are also concerned about the 
loss of competition and resulting 
inefficiencies that may arise. 
These obstacles notwithstanding, 
Petrobras is well positioned to 
take on the pre-salt projects. Its 
investment is on the rise, and capital 
inflows are increasing from foreign 
and domestic sources. The technical 
challenges are surmountable and will 
give the company greater experience 
in ultra-deepwater fields, cementing 
its position as the most successful 
and experienced deepwater driller. 
Brazil is already self-sufficient in 
oil production and consumption. 
When all of the pre-salt projects 
come online—probably around 
2020—Petrobras should become a 
major oil exporter. ■
Genaro Arriagada is a non-resident 
senior fellow and Chris Cote is a 
program assistant for economics at the 
Inter-American Dialogue.
Oil drilling platform off the coast of Brazil.
